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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

In re:

PG&E CORPORATION

-and-

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY

Debtors.

Bankruptcy Case
No. 19-30088 (DM)

Chapter 11
(Lead Case)
(Jointly Administered)

**OBJECTION OF COLUMBUS HILL
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.
TO MOTION OF THE AD HOC
GROUP OF SUBROGATION CLAIM
HOLDERS TO TERMINATE THE
DEBTORS' EXCLUSIVE PERIODS**

Date: August 13, 2019
Time: 9:30 a.m. (Pacific Time)
Place: United States Bankruptcy Court
Courtroom 17, 16th Floor
450 Golden Gate Avenue

Re: Docket No. 3147

- ☐ Affects PG&E Corporation
☐ Affects Pacific Gas and Electric Company
☒ Affects both Debtors

**All papers shall be filed in the Lead Case,
No. 19-30088 (DM).*

1 Columbus Hill Capital Management, L.P. (“Columbus Hill”), the manager of funds
2 that hold claims against, and interests in, Pacific Gas and Electric Company and PG&E
3 Corporation (collectively, the “Debtors”), for its objection to the *Motion of the Ad Hoc Group*
4 *of Subrogation Claim Holders to Terminate the Debtors’ Exclusive Periods* (the “Subrogation
5 Group Termination Motion”) [Docket No. 3147],¹ respectively represents:

6 1. On July 18, 2019, Columbus Hill filed its *Objection to the Motion of the Ad*
7 *Hoc Committee of Senior Unsecured Noteholders to Terminate the Debtors’ Exclusive Period*
8 (the “Ad Hoc Noteholder Termination Motion”) [Docket No. 3079] (the “Prior Columbus Hill
9 Objection”). The grounds set forth therein for denying the Ad Hoc Noteholder Termination
10 Motion apply equally to the Subrogation Group Termination Motion. Like the Ad Hoc
11 Noteholder Termination Motion, the Subrogation Group Termination Motion does not
12 demonstrate “cause” under Section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to terminate the Debtors’
13 plan exclusivity period. The factors relied upon by courts to determine whether to extend or
14 reduce exclusivity require denying the Subrogation Group Termination Motion. *See, e.g., In*
15 *re Dow Corning Corp.*, 208 B.R. 661, 663–670 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (denying motion to
16 terminate exclusivity).

17 2. As everyone is well aware, the Debtors chapter 11 cases are among the largest
18 *and most complex* chapter 11 cases ever filed. The Debtors are solvent. Termination of
19 exclusivity a mere seven months after the beginning of these cases will lead to chaos and
20 would hamper the Debtors’ ability to exercise their fiduciary duty to reconcile, estimate and
21 address claims alleged against it for the benefit of its key stakeholders. While progress
22 toward a framework for a plan has been made, unresolved contingencies still exist including,
23 but not limited to, the determination of the value of the wildfire claims asserted against the
24 Debtors. The Subrogation Group Termination Motion contains no justification for ignoring
25 these facts and terminating prematurely an exclusivity extension granted by this court on May
26

27 ¹ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Subrogation Group
28 Termination Motion.

1 23, 2019 after full briefing and a contested hearing. That the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group has
2 now put forward a plan construct that includes a proposed so-called “estimated recovery” for
3 holders of Subrogation Claims should not change the conclusion made by the Court at the
4 May 23, 2019 hearing. Moreover, as discussed herein, the proposed “cap” on the distribution
5 to be made to holders of Subrogation Claims included in the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s
6 Restructuring Term Sheet is highly misleading and significantly overstated.

7 3. In addition to failing even to come close to meeting the legal standard for
8 exclusivity termination, the proposed “plan” construct outlined in the term sheet appended to
9 the Subrogation Group Termination Motion is not confirmable and does not even meet the
10 “credible and potentially confirmable” standard articulated by the court at the May 23, 2019
11 hearing. Columbus Hill files this objection to highlight, among other things, some of the
12 material defects in the “plan” construct proposed by the Subrogation Group.

13 4. Most notably, other than certain incorrectly premised terms applicable solely to
14 holders of Subrogation Claims in their “plan” construct, substantially all of the material
15 economic and business terms in the Subrogation Group’s plan are blank. As such, the Ad
16 Hoc Subrogation Group’s “plan” construct is neither credible nor confirmable. The
17 unresolved contingencies that must be satisfied before such terms can be finalized must be
18 resolved in the context of the Debtors’ claims resolution, estimation and plan process. These
19 terms may be the subject of discussion among key stakeholders, but, certainly exclusivity
20 need not be terminated to facilitate such discussions. Moreover, terminating exclusivity for
21 the benefit of the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group (or any other group) would make it more
22 difficult for such discussions to occur in a productive manner, and, as previously discussed,
23 would create chaos.

24 5. Material terms in the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s “plan” construct that are
25 currently blank include: (i) the amount of the proposed rights offering under which existing
26 stockholders would fund the Debtors’ exit from chapter 11; (ii) the reorganized equity value
27 at which such rights would be issued; (iii) the allocation of claims in Classes 1A and 1C

1 arising from the Tubbs wildfire and those that arise from other wildfires; and (iv) funding
2 amounts and mechanics for the trust proposed to be established to assume and pay wildfire
3 claims held by individual uninsured and underinsured tort creditors. As noted in the
4 Subrogation Group Termination Motion, many of these “blanks” are dependent on
5 determining the total wildfire claims pool. *See* Subrogation Group Termination Motion at p.
6 2-3. Given the various open items that bear on the liquidation of the Wildfire Claims,
7 including the review and reconciliation of proofs of claim, the Debtors’ proposed estimation
8 framework and the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s and the Tort Claimants Committee’s
9 respective motions for relief from the automatic stay seeking authority to litigate claims
10 arising from the Tubbs fire in state court, it will take at least several months to arrive at an
11 approximate range for the total wildfire claims pool.

12 6. The Ad Hoc Subrogation Group seeks unlawfully to coerce PG&E Corporation
13 stockholders to execute plan support agreements by September 30, 2019. Even if sufficient
14 information were available to provide consents prior to that date, such plan construct for these
15 solvent Debtors is patently unconfirmable for the reasons set forth herein. The Ad Hoc
16 Subrogation Group, if such consents are not provided in sufficient amounts, would rescind its
17 proposed rights offering construct, which would then be “reallocated in the discretion of the
18 Ad Hoc Subrogation Group.” *See id.*, at p. 15. Under the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s
19 construct, PG&E Corporation stockholders would have a choice either to (i) execute a support
20 agreement to commit to finance a proposed plan prior to the material terms of such plan being
21 known or (ii) decline to execute support agreements, vote to reject the proposed “plan” and
22 oppose confirmation under Section 1129(b) of the Code against what would be a massive
23 impairment and dilution of their ownership interests under the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s
24 proposed “plan” construct. This Court should not permit the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group to
25 coerce PG&E Corporation stockholders, which would be impaired under the proposed plan
26 construct and would be entitled to vote to accept or reject a chapter 11 plan under the

1 Bankruptcy Code and other applicable law and rules, including with respect to the issuance of
2 new equity.

3 7. The Ad Hoc Subrogation Group's proposed "plan" construct similarly fails to
4 meet the credible and confirmable standard articulated by the Court. The Ad Hoc Subrogation
5 Group proposes to bind the Debtors to an overstated aggregate amount of Subrogation Claims
6 and provide a recovery on those claims far in excess of such amount and far in excess of what
7 they are entitled to under the Bankruptcy Code. The "estimated recovery" asserted by the
8 holders of Subrogation Claims is approximately \$15.8 billion, which is an extremely inflated
9 amount. *See id.*, at p. 4. In a footnote, the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group purports to demonstrate
10 that the real value of their claims is in excess of \$20 billion and that the \$15.8 billion
11 represents an approximate 70% recovery or distribution on aggregate Subrogation Claims. *See*
12 *id.*, at fn. 4. First, such 70% approximation is arbitrary and inconsistent with historical
13 settlements of subrogation claims.² Second, this amount includes claims arising from the
14 Tubbs fire, which CalFire has determined was not caused by the Debtors, as well as other
15 amounts that may not be recoverable under applicable California law, including billions in
16 attorneys' fees. *See id.* The aggregate amount of Subrogation Claims should be determined
17 after the claims reconciliation and estimation process, and not by filings with the California
18 Department of Insurance that are not before the Court.

19 8. In addition to providing for an inflated claim amount, the Ad Hoc Subrogation
20 Group proposes to secure unlawfully a windfall for holders of Subrogation Claims by
21 providing for the satisfaction of such claims with Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock that
22 would convert over time into PG&E Corporation common stock at a material discount to the
23 then applicable market value. This would entitle the holders of Subrogation Claims to receive
24 a substantial portion of the equity in the reorganized Debtors, thereby subjecting the existing
25 stockholders to substantial dilution of their interests. As a threshold matter, there is no reason

² *See, e.g., Utility Risk Financing Options*, Testimony of David J. Heller, Edison International Vice President, Risk Management and Insurance, Before the Commission on Catastrophic Wildfire Cost and Recovery. April 3, 2019, at p. 8 (testifying that "subrogation claims are settled at historical levels, around 50%").

1 for Subrogation Claims to be paid in stock or other securities when they can and should,
2 particularly in these solvent estates, be paid in cash. In addition, the Mandatory Convertible
3 Preferred Stock is proposed to include an 8% per annum paid-in-kind dividend that would
4 also convert over time into PG&E Corporation common stock at the same material discount
5 and further dilution to existing stockholders. Factoring in the material conversion discount
6 and proposed paid-in-kind dividend makes clear that the holders of Subrogation Claims will
7 receive far in excess of the inflated and misleading \$15.8 billion “estimated recovery” or
8 “cap” set forth in the Ad Hoc Subrogation Group’s Restructuring Term Sheet, and far more
9 than they would be legally entitled to under the Bankruptcy Code. It is no wonder that the
10 Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock forms the “cornerstone” of the Ad Hoc Subrogation
11 Group’s proposed plan: there is simply no reason to provide holders of Subrogation Claims
12 with such a windfall when they can and should be paid in cash on the effective date of a plan.

13 9. In addition to there being no factual or legal basis to terminate the Debtors’
14 exclusivity under Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code, permitting the Ad Hoc Subrogation
15 Group to pursue confirmation of such a plan construct would prevent the Debtors from
16 exercising their fiduciary obligations to take actions necessary to ensure they are not required
17 to make distributions on account of claims for which they have no liability, such as claims
18 arising from the Tubbs fire. For the reasons set forth herein and in the Prior Columbus Hill
19 Objection, Columbus Hill submits that the Debtors must be permitted to use their exclusive
20 periods to continue to address all of the issues that are preconditions to a successful
21 reorganization here, including finalizing a mechanism or process for resolving, allowing and
22 satisfying pre-petition wildfire claims and liabilities and meeting applicable safety and
23 regulatory requirements. Accordingly, Columbus Hill respectfully requests that the
24 Termination Motion be denied in all respects.
25

26 *[Signature Page Follows]*
27

1 Respectfully submitted,

2 Dated: August 6, 2019

/s/ Robert Sahyan

3 **SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER &**
4 **HAMPTON LLP**

5 *Attorneys for Columbus Hill Capital*
6 *Management, L.P.*

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